[Vol. 106

BOOK REVIEWS
THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS. By Alexander M. Bickel, with an introduction by Paul
A. Freund. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. xxi, 278. $6.00.
Is it proper now to publish opinions that Mr. Justice Brandeis decided
not to publish?
There is little danger in releasing the opinions themselves. However,
since any meaningful publication must disclose secret votes of the Court
and private communications among the Justices, does such publication
violate the confidence which the Justices assumed and thereby impair the
freedom of communication essential for the Court's functioning? A reviewer of a recent biography which, without discussion of the ' proprieties,
drew heavily on such materials expressed a fear that "The justices in the
future may write their personal notes more carefully with a view to their
effect on posterity." 1
The question is not so simple as Professors Bickel and Freund would
make it. The fact that "what we know, we know because Brandeis thought
it useful that we know it; else he would not have seen t6 the preservation
of these files" (p. viii) is not decisive even as to the opinions themselves,
and still less so as to the votes of the Court and the communications from
Brandeis' colleagues. The argument that "if there is danger that free
intercourse among present ones [Justices] may be inhibited by 'disclosures'
about their predecessors, free intercourse must already be severely inhibited" by publications already made (p. ix), is rather like saying that
if the ship is leaking, sink it. Professor Freund's asserted analogies, the
ultimate publication of diplomatic correspondence or of the debates of the
Constitutional Convention (p. xvi), are a long way from revealing the
intimacies of the Supreme Court's conference room. Neither is the case
furthered by the "precedent" (p. ix) of the publication, in 117 U.S. of Chief
Justice Taney's unpublished opinion in Gordon v. United States.2 For
the serious question relates not so much to the opinions themselves as to
the votes and discussions before and after.
The authors are on firmer ground when they suggest that the balance
between the conflicting claims of history and privacy is struck when, or a
reasonable period after, all participants have left the Court. (p. viii).
Certainly it is not struck before this, and perhaps some such restriction
ought to be imposed by rule of the Court if the good taste of authors does
not produce voluntary observance. Beyond this the authors urge that "the
intimacies here described are not aimless or malicious disclosures; they are
1. MASON, HARLAw Fis=c STom: PMnAR oP 'rH
Frederick D. G. Ribble, 57 CoLum.L. Riw. 605 (1957).
2. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865).
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relevant to understanding, and so, to use a favorite word of Justice Brandeis,
they are instructive." (p. xvi).
Instructive, indeed, they are, with the illuminating preludes and postludes as to the background and the effect of the opinions which Professor
Bickel has provided. Perhaps they instruct most of all in disclosing to
what degree Brandeis' career on the bench was a continuation of his
success at the bar. To Justice Holmes' remark that Brandeis "really
was an advocate rather than a Judge," 3 Brandeis would doubtless have
responded that one of a bench of nine could not fulfill his duties as a judge
unless he was an advocate. Decision came swiftly to him-he knew nothing
of Cardozo's anguish or "wrestling with the angel." 4 But the personal
decision, which was the end of the judicial process for Holmes, was only
the beginning of it for Brandeis. For him the path of duty was not merely
to arrive at the truth but to make it prevail.
What is immensely revealing in this book, especially to those who have
come to think of Brandeis primarily as a great dissenter, is how often he
did make his views prevail, with a bench that was scarcely hospitable to
them. He did this in the traditional manner of the advocate-by putting
them in a way acceptable to those he was seeking to convince.
Brandeis' unpublished opinion in the Arizona Employers' Liability
Cases (pp. 61-76) illustrates this technique. In upholding the workmen's
compensation acts of New York and Iowa,5 Justice Pitney had stressed
the benefit to the employer in being freed from the risk of large verdicts
in suits at common law. While this result was unanimous, it could hardly
have been enthusiastic. For a Washington statute, differing only in exacting compulsory contributions to a state liability insurance fund, passed
muster by a vote of only five to four, with Justice Pitney writing for the
majority, and Chief Justice White and Justices McKenna, Van Devanter
and McReynolds dissenting without opinion.6 Arizona added a new difficulty. Its statutes gave the employee in a hazardous industry an option
either to proceed under the workmen's compensation law or to bring an
action in which the only defense was proof that the injury was due to the
employee's own negligence, with this always a question for the jury.
Despite this difference, the five-man majority of the Washington case at
first held together and, indeed, gained the adherence of Chief Justice White.
The latter assigned the opinion to Justice Holmes, who wrote and circulated
the opinion that now appears as a special concurrence of Holmes, Brandeis
and Clarke 1 Apparently, however, the broad language of Holmes' opinion
lost the majority previously attained. Brandeis thereupon prepared an
opinion that forsook Holmes' philosophical approach and answered each
of the objections to the Arizona statute on a basis which Pitney and Day
could accept. Couched initially as a dissent, it led to a reargument and the
reconstitution of the five-man majority of the Washington case.
3. Letter to Harold J. Laski, Dec. 11, 1930, cited at p. 222.
4. L. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in THn SpmIT oi Lmaiy' 131 (1941).

5. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly,
243 U.S. 210 (1917).
6. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
7. 250 U.S. 400, 431 (1919).
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Taft's accession as Chief Justice at the beginning of the 1921 Term
would have posed a problem for lesser men. In the Ballinger hearings of
1910 Brandeis had demonstrated that the then President not only had been
somewhat less than candid with the public but had gone along with his
Attorney General's predating a memorandum as of the time of a previous
oral report.8 Six years later Taft was one of the first to sign the statement
of former presidents of the American Bar Association advising the Senate
of their "painful duty to say to you that in their opinion, taking into view
the reputation, character, and professional career of Mr. Louis D. Brandeis,
he is not a fit person to be a member of the Supreme Court of the United
States." 9 Yet, as biographers of both men have shown, all feelings of
hostility, or even of embarrassment, disappeared once they became colleagues on the Court. 10 Professor Bickel's volume reveals that their relationship soon went far beyond judicial cameraderie. Brandeis realized
that while Taft might have only "a first rate second rate mind" (p. 203), it
was not a closed mind-and that, once persuaded, Taft could do far better
than Brandeis in shepherding the brethren. The book shows that two of
Taft's most famous opinions, both for unanimous Courts, in United Mine
Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.," and Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton,'2 had
their origins in proposed dissenting opinions with which Brandeis persuaded Taft, who then carried the gospel to their colleagues. (pp. 77-118).
In the first of the unpublished opinions (pp. 5-14), that in Atherton
Mills v. Johnston,'8 Brandeis is already sounding what was to become one
of his favorite themes--"the conviction that the Court must take the utmost
pains to avoid precipitate decision of constitutional issues, and that it must
above all decide such issues only when it is absolutely unable otherwise
to dispose of a case properly before it." (pp. 2-3). A suit testing the
constitutionality of the Child Labor Tax Act, should be dismissed as not
a "case" within the Federal judicial power, Brandeis wrote, because the
child that brought suit against the employer who threatened his discharge
was only an employee at will.
Despite Professor Bickel's admiring quotation of Brandeis' epigram,
"The most important thing we do is not doing" (p. 17), it may be queried
whether this drum deserved all the beating that Brandeis was to give it
over the years. Of course, the Court should not decide the constitutionality
of a statute without fully hearing those interested in sustaining it. But the
United States had appeared in Atherton through the Solicitor General as*
amicus curiae, and Congress has now assured such participation from the
4
outset where the constitutionality of federal legislation is in question.'
Suppose that young Johnston had been hired by Atherton Mills for a term
8.
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of years subject to earlier dismissal if his continued employment would
result in imposition of a federal tax not otherwise payable.. The considerations with respect to the desirability of constitutional adjudication would
scarcely seem altered; yet presumably even Brandeis would have had to
admit that here a "case" was presented. It is by no means obvious that
delay in decision, constitutional or otherwise, is inevitably an advantage.
Indeed, Professor Bickel contends, (pp. 16-17), although on somewhat
slender evidence, that Brandeis' holding action in Atherton led to the dissipation of what was then a majority in favor of the constitutionality of the
Child Labor Tax Act. Surely one of the unhappiest chapters of Brandeis'
judicial career was when his zeal against the declaratory judgment led him
to deliver, in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,15 what justice Stone
declared to be itself a declaratory judgment against the application of this
remedy in the federal courts-a dictum which a unanimous Court, including Brandeis, was obliged to'ignore nine years later. 16
This volume is eloquent also in illustrating how deeply Brandeis cared
about how much. He was incapable of mediocrity. He gave the same
zeal, the same passion for thoroughness, and the same skill in the organization of his materials to contending that a municipal ordinance was not "a
statute of any state" within the meaning of the Court's jurisdictional statute
as he did in urging that the fourth amendment be applied to prevent
"subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy" than the fathers
had known.Y7 None of the opinions now published in this volume concerns
one of the great issues of Brandeis' constitutional adjudication; 18 yet all
of them reveal the concentration of emotion, of intellect, and of hard work
that characterize his greatest deliverances.
An appendix, (pp. 239-48), includes brief biographical sketches of
Brandeis' colleagues and a useful chart showing the composition of the
Court at various dates.
Henry I. Friendly t
15. 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
16. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), sustaining the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, in 28 U.S.C. § 2200 (1952). Actually the Atherton Mills
opinion itself finds Brandeis violating his own precept. Not satisfied with holding that
the suit as filed did not present a "case or controversy," he went on to say that "By no
conceivable amendments can it be made to state a good cause of action in equity."
(p. 13). In the eve of his career, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Justice
Brandeis again departed from his policy of avoiding constitutional issues, in an effort,
similar to that in Willing, to render the decision immune from congressional reversal.
See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine,
67 YALE L.J. 187, 188-89 (1957).
17. Dissenting opinions in King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 115 (1928),
and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 473 (1928).
18. Perhaps one should except Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., (pp. 12952), where an Illinois $1000 minimum tax levied on an interstate railway that would
have paid only $135 on an apportioned basis became the occasion for expression of
Brandeis' views as to the power of the state legislatures to deal with "bigness,"
some of which appeared later in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933).
t Member, New York Bar.
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ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, SECOND EDITION. By
Edwin W. Patterson. New York, Toronto, London: McGrawHill Book Company, Inc., 1957. Pp. xiv, 558. $7.50.
The Second Edition of Essentials of Insurance Law is an excellent
treatise written by an author with broad knowledge of all branches of insurance law. Since the First Edition was published in 1935 there have been
material changes in the law of insurance brought about by judicial decisions
and by legislative enactments. This treatise is now thoroughly up to date.
Professor Patterson, Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia
University, one of the leading (if not the leading) author on insurance
subjects today, is a careful writer and certainly care is needed with any
relatively short treatise in which so many statements must necessarily be
of a general nature. The broad field of insurance law is exceedingly well
covered in a limited number of pages-and this is no easy task. The book
is well documented, especially for a book written for use to a considerable
degree by persons other than lawyers.
Professor Patterson published the First Edition of this work at just
about the time he was commencing his duties as a Deputy Superintendent
of Insurance of New York. His particular function there was in connection
with the revision of the New York Insurance Law which was completed
in 1939. He did the major part of the work and he did it well. This can be
said whether or not you agree with the philosophy of the New York
Insurance Law which attempts to spell out in detail matters which, perhaps, might best be left to administration and which, in several particulars
unrelated to the protection of New York policyholders, attempts to regulate
out-of-state insurers on a national basis. His experience with the New
York Insurance Department and considerable other insurance work outside of the classroom has given to Professor Patterson a thorough understanding of the practical as well as the theoretical phase of insurance. Some
other insurance authors have not been so fortunate.
In arrangement this edition follows the general pattern of the First
Edition but there are distinct improvements. The foremost, perhaps, is
the fact that in the Second Edition citations are more generous and are
placed on the same page as the text which the citations support. He has
followed the pattern of the First Edition in summarizing important points
at the end of each chapter.
In his Law Journaland other writings Professor Patterson has specialized on waiver, estoppel and election. The last chapter of his book covers
these points and is exceedingly well done.
Insurance supervisory authorities of the states will be particularly
interested in his estimate of the present calibre of state supervision. He is
not flattering.
"The chief threat to the continuance of state regulation comes from
the low standards of regulation and the lax or inefficient methods of
supervision of some states. Especially is this an evil when a state
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fails to curb the deception and claim dodging of companies that,
organized under its laws, have their principal offices within its territory and practice their wiles by advertising in other states where they
are not licensed to do business. These other states have as yet found
no effective way to protect their residents against such practices."
(p. 6).
This criticism comes from a man who is a recognized authority on insurance
regulation. He is the author of an excellent book on the subject, The
Insurance Commissioner in the United States, which was published in
1927, and he served for four years in one of the leading insurance departments as indicated above.
Professor Patterson may be just a little too pessimistic when he says
that states where the insurance company is not licensed have found no
effective way to protect their citizens against bad practices of unlicensed
companies. Some years ago the National Association of Insurance Commissioners drafted and recommended a uniform act known as the "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act." This is now the law in more than forty
of our states. In December of 1957 the United States Supreme Court upheld the California Act.' In the case in question suit was permitted in
California against a non-admitted insurer where the only business done
by the company in California was the issuance of the particular policy by
mail from Texas to the insured, who lived in California, and the subsequent
collection of premiums by mail. If the citizens of a state are permitted to
sue the unlicensed insurer in their own courts, this would seem to give
substantial protection to them. This protection they now have in most
states.
Professor Patterson has recognized, and correctly, (p. 4), that the law
governing insurance contracts is even more strongly dominated by the
state law of the location of the risk than was true when he wrote his First
Edition. The older United States Supreme Court decisions must be read
with this change ever in mind. Many of these cases have not yet been overruled but the authority of these older cases is subject to question.
There is really very little to criticize in this excellent work. Although
remarkably free from error, I should like to disagree with a few of his stateinents. For example, Professor Patterson credits the Hughes' reforms of
1906 to 1907 with the development of standard provisions for life insurance
policies. (p. 25). This is not the fact. Mr. Hughes (and the Armstrong
Committee) attempted to solve the problem not by standard provisions but
rather by standard policies and the New York law was so drafted and enacted in 1906. Standard provisions for life policies were developed by a
committee of three attorneys general and twelve insurance commissioners
from the several states, known as the "Committee of Fifteen." New York
experimented with standard policies (for domestic companies only) for two
1. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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or three years and then followed the lead of the other states which had
adopted standard provisions.
Professor Patterson is also wrong on a few other minor points. He
indicates in several places, for example, that the leading case of Paul v.
Virginia2 was decided in 1868 when, in fact, that decision was not handed
down until November 1, 1869, although the Term of the Supreme Court was
"December, 1868." This is a common error contributed to by the fact
that at that time the official reports of the United States Supreme Court
did not show the date of decision. He says also that only Rhode Island
adheres exclusively to special acts of incorporation for insurance companies. (p. 16). Connecticut definitely is in that category. He indicates
that a binding receipt in life insurance makes a temporary contract of insurance subject to the condition of rejection by the company which terminates the coverage. (p. 100). This is not the general effect of conditional or binding receipts and the two cases cited in support of the text
represent distinctly the minority view.
These minor points should, perhaps, not even be mentioned in a review
of such an excellent treatise as Professor Patterson has written. The book
is one in which he should be proud and certainly it is in keeping with the
high standards he has set in his numerous previous insurance law writings.
Buist M. Anderson t
2. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
t Member, Alabama, Connecticut and United States Supreme Court Bars and
author of the Third Edition of Vatwe on Insurance.

